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BOOK REVIEW 
MOMMY HAS A BLUE WHEELCHAIR: 
RECOGNIZING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF 
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES* 
Michael Ashley Stein t 
A MOTHER'S TOUCH: THE TIFFANY CALLO STORY, Jay Mathews, 
New York: Henry Holt & Co. (1992). 265 pp. 
A five-year-old [able-bodied child] told her paraplegic mother: 
"When I grow up I want to be a mommy, and have a van and a blue 
wheelchair." "Oh, you won't need that," the mother said. "But I like 
blue," the child insisted.1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1979, a Los Angeles Superior Court judge transferred 
the custody of quadriplegic William Carney's two sons, who 
had been living with him for three years, to their absentee 
able-bodied mother.2 The court held that, because William was 
not able to play Little League baseball with his sons or take 
* © 1994 Michael Ashley Stein. All Rights Reserved. 
t Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, New York University Law School; 
Adjunct Professor of English, New York University; President, National Disabled 
Bar Association, 1992-94. Heartfelt thanks to Barbara Dildine, Chava Willig Levy, 
Martha Minow, Kenneth Rabb, Carol Sanger and Jonathan Weiss for commenting 
on earlier drafts, and to Taini Lefko for her assistance and encouragement. This 
paper was presented on March 29, 1994, to the New York University Law School 
faculty; I am grateful for their comments. I also am indebted to Dean John Sexton 
for his generous support. 
1 JAY MATHEWS, A MOTHER'S TOUCH: THE TIFFANY CALLO STORY at vii (1992) 
(quoting psychologist Megan Kirshbaum). 
2 In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 37 (Cal. 1979). 
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them fishing, William's custody ''wouldn't be a normal relation-
ship between father and boys," and therefore "it would be det-
rimental for the boys to grow up until age 18 in the custody of 
their father."3 The California Supreme Court reversed the 
superior court on the ground that the decision ''was affected by 
serious misconceptions as to the importance of the involvement 
of parents in the purely physical aspects of their children's 
lives."4 Those "serious misconceptions," the supreme court rea-
soned, had led the superior court to "stereotype [ ] William as a 
person deemed forever unable to be a good parent simply be-
cause he is physically handicapped."5 
Less than·- a decade after the Carney decision, the Santa 
Clara County Department of Social Services removed David 
and Jesse Calla from the custody of their disabled6 mother, 
3 Id. at 41 (emphasis omitted). 
'Id. 
5 Id. at 42. 
6 The term "disabled" and phrase "individuals with disabilities," as used in 
this Book Review, refer only to individuals with a motor- or sensory-related im-
pairment and specifically do not relate to individuals who are developmentally dis-
abled. For analysis of the familial and procreative rights .of the developmentally 
disabled, which raise different legal and social issues than those of individuals 
with physical disabilities, see generally SARAH F. HAAVIK & KARL A. MENNINGER 
II, SEXUALITY, LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSON: LEGAL AND 
CLINICAL AsPECTS OF MARRIAGE, PARENTHOOD AND STERllJZATION (1981); Robert L. 
Burgdorf, Jr. & Marcia P. Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch Is Almost Dead: Buck v. 
Bell and the Sterilization of Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMPLE L.Q. 995 (1977); 
Martha A Field, Honest Differences in Discerning the Constitution's Meaning-The 
Task of Defining Constitutional Rights for Persons Who Are Retarded, 72 IOWA L. 
REv. 1301 (1987); Robert L. Hayman Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, 
and the Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1990). 
In addition, the term "disabled" and phrase "individuals with disabilities" will 
not always include people who have been tested positive for the Human Immuno-
deficiency Virus ("HIV"). The reason for this semi-inclusion bears noting. Following 
the inclusive interpretation by courts of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as 
amended 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) ("No otherwise qualified individ-
ual with a disability in the United States, . . . shall, by reason of her or his dis-
ability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving a Federal 
financial assistance .... "), the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") committee 
reports explicitly recognized HIV-positivity as a disability. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 
101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333; 
H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451; S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989); see also 
Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that 
HIV-positive teacher transferred to an administrative job had strong possibility of 
success on the merits under the Rehabilitation Act); Local 1812, American Fed'n of 
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Tiffany Callo. Gallo's struggle to regain custody of her children 
is recounted in journalist Jay Mathews's7 sensitive and en-
grossing book, A Mother's Touch: The Tiffany Gallo Story. 8 
I. MYTHS AND MISCONCEPTIONS 
In 1980, Professor Robert Burgdorf,9 a prominent dis-
abled, disability rights advocate, wrote that mainstream 
society's historical treatment of individuals with disabilities 
"can be summed up in two words: segregation and inequali-
ty."10 Studies on the status of disabled Americans conducted 
Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987) 
(finding that IITV-positive foreign service employees were likely to prevail in their 
suit under the Rehabilitation Act). This recognition is especially laudable-and 
unfortunately necessary as well-because of continuing prejudice against IITV-in-
fected people, particularly when they also are gay. 
The issues raised in custodial disputes involving IITV-positive parents are not 
always the same as those involving parents with other physical disabilities. Both 
groups, however, must rebut misconceptions about the "abnormality" of their 
parenting relationships, and debilitated IITV-infected parents may be questioned 
about their ability to physically care for their children. See, e.g., Jane W. v. John 
W., 137 Misc. 2d 24, 519 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1987). Similarly, 
the parental rights of HIV-positive people are most often challenged on the basis 
of either alleged shortened life expectancy or risk of transmission. See, e.g., Steven 
L. v. Dawn J., 148 Misc. 2d 779, 561 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Fam. Ct. Kings County 1990); 
Doe v. Roe, 139 Misc. 2d 209, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1988). The 
custodial concerns of IITV-infected parents are addressed in a number of fine arti-
cles. See generally Nancy B. Mahon, Public Hysteria, Private Conflict: Child Gusto· 
dy and Visitation Disputes Involving an HIV Infected Parent, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1092 (1988); Carol Sanger, M Is for Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S 
STUD. 15 (1992). 
7 Mathews is a correspondent for Newsweek and a former Los Angeles Bureau 
Chief of the Washington Post. Mathews's previous publications include Escalante: 
The Best Teacher in America, published in 1988, which formed the basis for the 
film Lean on Me. 
8 MATHEWS, supra note 1. 
9 Professor Burgdorf was one of the central authors and proponents of the 
Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (Supp. IV 1992) 
[hereinafter ADA). See JOSEPH P. SHAPffiO, NO ~: PEOPLE WITH DISABU.ITIES 
FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 106-16 (1993). For Burgdorf's own anal-
ysis of the ADA, see Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: 
Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Btatute, 26 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413 (1991). 
10 ROBERT L. BURGDORF, JR., THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS: 
CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT 51 (1980). Many studies have been conducted of the 
historical treatment of disabled people. See, e.g., DISABLED PEOPLE AS SECOND-
CLASS CITIZENS (Myron G. Eisenberg et al. eds., 1982); JOHN B. FRIEDMAN, THE 
MONSTROUS RACES IN MEDIEVAL ART AND THOUGHT (1981); ELIOT FruEDSON, DIS-
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by non-disability-related (and thus presumably more objective) 
organizations have confirmed Professor Burgdorf's analysis. 
For example, the United States Commission on Civil Rights 
echoed Professor Burgdorf's statement, finding that 
"[h]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate 
handicapped people.''11 Congress used almost identical lan-
guage in its legislative findings and purposes for the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act ("ADA'').12 
ABILITY AS SOCIAL DEVIANCE IN SOCIOLOGY AND REHABILITATION (Martin B. 
Sussman ed., 1965); FREDERICK WATSON, CIVILIZATION AND THE CRIPPLE (1930); 
Nettie Bartel & Samuel Guskin, A Handicap as a Social Phenomenon, in PSY-
CHOLOGY OF EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN AND YOUTH 75 (William M. Cruickshank ed., 
4th ed. 1971); Gustav F. Schultz, The Cripple in Primitive Society, 8 AM. J. CARE 
FOR CRIPPLES 335 (1920). The sensitivity of these studies generally corresponds 
with the nomenclature used to describe their subjects. 
11 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPEC-
TRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 159 (1983). Graphic examples of how severely peo-
ple with physical disabilities are segregated from mainstream society were provid-
ed by the findings of an independent nationwide poll of disabled Americans con-
ducted in 1986 by Louis Harris and Associates ("Harris Poll"). INTERNATIONAL CTR. 
FOR THE DISABLED, THE lCD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING DISABLED 
AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM (1986). The survey found that two-thirds of all 
working-age people with disabilities are unemployed. Id. at 47. In addition, the 
survey found that during the one-year period prior to the poll, nearly two-thirds of 
the disabled did not attend movies, three-fourths did not see live theater or music 
performances, two-thirds of disabled people did not attend sporting events, 17% 
did not eat in restaurants, and 13% did not shop in grocery stores. Id. at 37-40; 
see also NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE 5 (1986) 
(more than 20% of working-age individuals with disabilities are below the poverty 
level). The results of the Harris Poll are cited often by disability rights groups. 
See, e.g., NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL POLICY OF 
THE 1986 HARRIS SURVEY OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (1988); NATIONAL 
COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE (1988). The 
results of the Harris Poll were cited also by Congress during hearings on the 
ADA. See Guaranteed Job Opportunity Act: Joint Hearing on S. 777 Before the 
Subcomm. on Employment and Productivity and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped 
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 
2, at 9 (1987) (statement of Humphrey Taylor), quoted in S. REP. No. 116, 101st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1989) & H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Gong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 31 
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 313; see also H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st 
Gong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 25 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 447. 
12 
"[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with 
disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1992). It was perhaps for these 
reasons that Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D.-Mass.) described the legislation's en-
actment as "an emancipation proclamation" for disabled Americans. 135 CONG. 
REc. S10,789 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989); see also Nathaniel C. Nash, Bush and Sen· 
ate Leaders Support Sweeping Protection for Disabled, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1989, at 
A1 (quoting, Ralph G. Neas, Executive Director of the Leadership Conference on 
Civil Rights, who labeled the legislation as "the most comprehensive civil rights 
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Underlying and reinforcing the segregation of people with 
disabilities are a series of myths arising from misconceptions 
about the disabled.13 The most ubiquitous of those myths (and 
one that I have discussed at length elsewhere14) casts physi-
cally disabled people in alternative, albeit dichotomous roles: 
as pitiable poster children or inspirational "supercrips." The 
paradigmatic poster child is, of course, any one of the children 
paraded on television during the annual Labor Day Muscular 
Dystrophy Telethon. A model "supercrip" is paraplegic park 
ranger Mark Wellman, who climbed a granite peak in Yosemi-
te National Park.15 Because the burden of achieving 
"supercrip" status is beyond the power of most people-let 
alone those with physical impairments-the result of this dual 
mythology has been to associate physically disabled people 
with pity.16 
Another particularly pervasive myth about physically 
disabled people is that they either are sexually unwilling or 
unable (the "disabled non-sexuality myth").17 Nationally syn-
measure in the past two and a half decades"). 
13 Psychologist Carol Gill has correctly noted society's emphasis on "the needs 
and interests of men with disabilities to the virtual neglect of women." Carol Gill, 
Getting Ready: Six Trends That Will Challenge People with Disabilities Through 
1994-And Beyond, MAINSTREAM: MAG. OF THE ABLE-DISABLED, Dec. 1993/Jan. 
1994, at 27, 28. Accordingly, this Book Review will attempt to address the needs 
and concerns raised by women with disabilities. See generally Jo CAMPLING, IMAG-
ES OF OURSELVES: WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES TALKING (1981); ANN C. CARRIT..LO ET 
AL., NO MORE STARES (1982); WITH THE POWER OF EACH BREATH: A DISABLED 
WOMEN'S ANTHOLOGY (Susan E. Browne et al. eds., 1985); WITH WINGS: AN AN-
THOLOGY OF LITERATURE BY AND ABOUT WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES (Marsha Sax-
ton & Florence Howe eds., 1987); WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES: ESSAYS IN PSYCHOLO-
GY, CULTURE AND POLITICS (Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch eds., 1988). 
14 Michael Ashley Stein, From Crippled to Disabled: The Legal Empowerment of 
Americans with Disabilities, 43 EMORY L.J. 245, 249-51 (1994). 
15 See id. at 250. 
16 A survey of non-disabled people on their feelings toward individuals with 
disabilities indicates that some 74% of non-disabled Americans feel pity for the 
disabled. LOUIS HARRIS & AsSOCIATES INC., PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD PEOPLE 
WITH DISABILITIES 13 (1991) [hereinafter PUBLIC ATTITUDES). The result is what 
disability rights advocate and ADA proponent Justin Dart, Jr. terms a "subhuman 
perception" of the disabled. See SHAPmo, supra note 9, at 109. 
17 LAURA F. RoTHSTEIN, RIGHTS OF PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED PERSONS 184 
(1984) (noting "a sociological/psychological obstacle regarding human sexuality and 
special problems of physically handicapped persons involving sexual relationships"); 
see also Cricket Potash, Sex: Pure and Not So Simple, DISABILITY RAG RESOURCE, 
May/June 1993, at 30 ("It is not uncommon for people in wheelchairs to be seen 
as asexual."). 
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dicated columnist Diane Piastro, whose feature, "Living With a 
Disability," receives several dozen letters a year with questions 
about disabled sexuality from non-disabled people, writes that 
"'[o]ne of the most common misconceptions about people with 
disabilities is that they can't have sex, don't want sex or are 
not interested in sex. People seem to think a disability neuters 
you sexually."ns 
Mainstream society's discomfort with the notion of dis-
abled people's relational intimacy is well documented. For 
example, the Louis Harris Public Attitudes Poll found that 
forty-six percent of able-bodied people stated they "would be 
concemed" if their teenage son or daughter dated a disabled 
person, and thirty-four percent ''would be concemed" if a friend 
or relative married a person with a disability.19 Mainstream 
discomfort has also been discussed in personal accounts of both 
disabled and non-disabled women. Photographer Angelina 
Hekki.ng, who has multiple sclerosis, notes that she retumed 
to Holland during the fifth month of her pregnancy to "be 
treated as a normal pregnant woman," because she felt that in 
the United States she ''was treated as a diseased person."20 
During the courtship of able-bodied writer Erica Levy Klein 
and her disabled husband-to-be Ken Kroll,21 Klein's friends 
and family advised her to "stay away from damaged goods" and 
not to "put a healthy body in a sick bed."22 Klein slowly lost 
patience. Finally, when she was told ''You can't be serious, 
Erica! What if his condition gets worse and he turns into a 
18 KEN KROLL & ERICA L. KLEIN, ENABLING ROMANCE: A GUIDE TO LOVE, SEX, 
AND RELATIONSHIPS FOR THE DISABLED (AND THE PEOPLE WHO CARE ABOUT THEM) 
16 (1992) (quoting Diane Piastro) (emphasis omitted). 
19 PUBLIC ATI'ITUDES, supra note 16, at 15. Last year I received quite a few 
mortified looks from a non-disabled audience ·when, in response to the question 
"What's your take on disabled sexuality?," I replied "Overwhelmingly in favor and 
as frequently as possible!" 
20 Angelina M.A. Hekking, Seeds of Light: Images of Healing, KALEIDOSCOPE: 
lNT'L MAG. LITERATURE, FINE ARTS & DISABILITY, Summer/Fall 1993, at 19, 21. 
21 Kroll and Klein are the authors of an exceptionally good book on disabled 
sexuality. See KROLL & KLEIN, supra note 18. The only shortfall of this book is 
that although it is comprehensive in scope-addressing disabled/non-disabled and 
disabled/disabled sexuality, self-loving, adaptive aides and innovative tech-
niques-no same-sex or cross-ethnic couples responded to Kroll and Klein's ques-
tionnaire. Their absence detracts from the inclusive focus of this otherwise out-
standing book. 
22 KROLL & KLEIN, supra note 18, at 12. 
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vegetable?," Klein "replied through clenched teeth: 'Then I'll 
just have to throw some butter and garlic on him and saute 
him.'"23 
The main consequences of the disabled non-sexuality myth 
are (1) difficulty in the formation of intimate interpersonal 
relationships between disabled and non-disabled people; (2) 
limited awareness and availability of health care services to 
women with disabilities; and (3) as a corollary to the myth, 
severe misperceptions about and often prejudices against indi-
viduals with disabilities acting in parental or guardianship ca-
pacities. 
First, the disabled non-sexuality myth and its attendant 
discomfort lead to a strong reluctance among the able-bodied to 
acknowledge or enter into romantic relationships with the 
disabled.24 The painful effects of mainstream aversion were 
made poignantly obvious by many of the individuals featured 
in Ken Kroll and Erica Levy Klein's book Enabling Romance: A 
Guide to Love, Sex and Relationships for the Disabled.25 
Marilyn, a woman who had had polio, told Kroll and Klein 
that: 
Right after becoming disabled, I discovered that ... men[ ] reacted 
23 KROLL & KLEIN, supra note 18, at 13. 
24 This attitude formed one of the tenets of the eugenics movement, started in 
the late nineteenth century, which, among other things, fought to prevent inter-
marriage between disabled and "normal" people on the theory that disabled 
people's "defects" were hereditary. See JOHN V. VAN CLEVE & BARRY A. CROUCH, 
A PLACE OF THEIR OWN: CREATING THE DEAF COMMUNITY IN AMERICA 148-50 
(1989). One leading expert on disabled sexuality has argued that "[t]he 'politics of 
eugenics' is the underpinning of social policy restricting disabled people's freedom 
of intimate association. . . . Eugenics has as its assumption that the child born to 
a disabled mother will inevitably be defective, not only in its physical characteris-
tics, but as a social, emotional and moral being." The Testimony: The Politics of 
Eugenics, DISABILITY RAG RESOURCE, May/June 1993, at 6 (testimony of Barbara 
Faye Waxman); see also HIRAM P. ARMs, THE INTERMARRIAGE OF THE DEAF: ITS 
MENTAL, MORAL, AND SOCIAL TENDENCIES (1887) (advocating against deaf/hearing 
marriages), cited in Edward A. Fay, Notices of Publications, 32 AM. ANNALS DEAF 
250-51 (1887). In fact, a 1922 proposed Model Eugenic Sterilization Law advanced 
sterilizing, among others, the following "categories" of people: "(4) Epileptic; ... 
(6) Diseased (including the tuberculous, the syphilitics, the leprous, and others 
with chronic, infectious and legally segregable diseases); (7) Blind (including those 
with seriously impaired vision); (8) Deaf (including those with seriously impaired 
hearing); (9) Deformed (including the crippled)." Burgdorf, Jr. & Burgdorf, supra 
note 6, at 1000 n.41 (quoting HARRY H. LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 466-77 (1922)). 
25 KROLL & KLEIN, supra note 18. 
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differently to me in many ways. There's a lot of avoidance, "shutting 
me out" of things, seeing me and quickly looking the other way, 
which never gives me the chance to establish eye contact, smile, or 
begin to speak. 
Not long after becoming disabled, I became aware that most 
people assume I no longer have feeling in my legs (I do), am not able 
to have sex (I can), cannot have an orgasm (I can), and that I cannot 
have sexual relationships. 
My sexuality is a part of me. Disability doesn't change it at 
all.26 
Similarly, Anne, who became a paraplegic as the result of a 
skiing accident, reported to Kroll and Klein that: 
Right after my accident, I asked my doctor if I could still have sex 
and get pregnant. Those issues were very important to me and to 
my self-esteem. His reply was something like "No need to worry 
yourself about those things," which I then interpreted to mean that, 
since I was disabled, I might as well forget about sex, romance, or 
anything like that. I became incredibly depressed and felt like my 
life was over .... Disabled people need to have it reaffirmed to them 
that they can still function sexually and still be complete human 
beings.27 
The experiences of the women interviewed by Kroll and 
Klein are corroborated by other women with disabilities, most 
notably those featured in· Harilyn Rousso's Disabled, Female, 
and Proud!: Stories of Ten Women With Disabilities.28 Rousso, 
a psychotherapist and disability rights activist with cerebral 
palsy, contributes the following personal account: 
When I was growing up, my parents and I accepted [the non-sexual-
ity] myth without question. We simply assumed that because I had a 
disability, I could not date, find a partner, or have children. AB a 
teenager and young adult, I put aside any hope of a social life and 
concentrated on my studies. It never occurred to me that I had any 
altemative, that I could have both a career and a romantic life?9 
26 KROLL & KLEIN, supra note 18, at 94. 
27 KROLL & KLEIN, supra note 18, at 19. 
28 See HARILYN RoUSSO, DISABLED, FEMALE, AND PROUD!: STORIES OF TEN 
WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES (1993). "I am absolutely written off by people at par-
ties, on the street. I'm looked past, ignored." Id. at 27 (quoting Adrienne Asch, 
blind civil rights investigator). 
29 Id. at 2. "My father and mother didn't expect much from me. They didn't 
expect me to go to school and get a job or get married and have children." Id. at 
101 (quoting Alice Crespo, blind court interpreter). Kroll and Klein correctly note, 
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In addition to these real-life stories, the discomfort with 
the notion of relational intimacy with disabled people also is 
reflected in popular literature.30 One illustration is offered by 
the interaction between Leopold Bloom and Gertie McDowell 
in James Joyce's Ulysses. While sitting on the beach, McDowell 
spots Bloom eyeing her. Aware of his gaze, and hoping that he 
can overlook her physical shortcomings, she flirts erotically 
with him. McDowell leans back slowly, drawing her skirt and 
petticoats farther up her legs as Bloom fantasizes about her. 
Bloom later discovers that McDowell has a disability-she 
walks with a limp. For Bloom, McDowell's disability negates 
her beauty and charm. He tells a friend rather chauvinistically 
"[t]he defect is ten times worse in a woman .... Glad I didn't 
know it when she was on show."31 
An even more graphic example of such prejudice appears 
in Charlton Ogburn's Winespring Mountain. Wick Carter ad-
mires Letty at a distance and often thinks ofher, until he dis-
covers that she is visually impaired. Carter is then: 
overwhelmed with embarrassment and with pity, repelled, fright-
ened. From that moment he had been unable to think of the emo-
tions he had nursed about her without an intense desire to hide 
from himself. He had been duped, not by her, of course-though 
deep inside he held it against her that, disqualified as she was, she 
had stirred such thoughts in him-but by fate. He had been made a 
fool of.32 
"[n]owhere is rejection by the non-disabled society more evident than in attitudes 
about the sexuality of the disabled, and, naturally, these negative feelings have a 
profound effect on quality of life." KROLL & KLEIN, supra note 18, at 36; see also 
William G. Stothers, The Smile: It Reminds Us That We Are Outcasts And Tells 
Us to Keep Our Distance, MAINSTREAM: MAG. OF THE ABLE-DISABLED, Dec. 
1993/Jan. 1994, at 62 ("Millions of people with disabilities are convinced their dis-
ability is their problem, if not their fault."). 
30 The emphasis on popular culture is not overstated. The Louis Harris Public 
Attitudes Poll found that popular culture was a "critical link" to mainstream un-
derstanding of disabled individuals. See PUBLIC ATI'J.TUDES POLL, supra note 16, at 
3-4. Some of the best discussions on this topic are collected in a single volume of 
essays on the popular imagery associated with the disabled. See generally Deborah 
Kent, Disabled Women: Portraits in Fiction and Drama, in !MAGES OF THE DIS-
ABLED, DISABLING !MAGES 47 (Alan Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987) [hereinafter 
DISABLING IMAGES]; Leonard Kriegel, The Cripple in Literature, in DISABLING !MAG-
ES, supra, at 31; Paul K Longmore, Screening Stereotypes: Images of Disabled 
People in Television and Motion Pictures, in DISABLING !MAGES, supra, at 65. 
31 JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 368 (Vintage lnt'l 1990) (1934). 
32 CHARLTON OGBURN, WINESPRING MOUNTAIN 49 (1973). 
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When Letty regains her sight, Carter resumes his previous 
amorous thoughts, this time without guilt.33 
Women with disabilities have attempted to address the 
difficult social-integration effect of the disabled non-sexuality 
myth in different ways. 34 In one highly publicized effort, Play-
boy Magazine published nude photographs of quadriplegic 
Ellen Stohl in its July 1987 issue. Stohl explained that her 
reason for posing was that, although she "realized [she] was 
still a woman[,] ... the world didn't accept [her] as that."35 In 
her letter to Playboy's publisher, Stohl asked, "Please don't 
treat me as an asexual object; treat me as a sexual object!"36 
The benefits enured from publication of Stohl's pictorial 
were hotly debated among members of the disabled communi-
ty. The Disability Rag ReSource, a progressive disability advo-
cacy magazine, ran three consecutive issues of articles and 
letters about Stohl's actions, many alluding to the irony of 
Playboy's ''breakthrough."37 Almost certainly, Playboy itself 
was not trying to be progressive. Playboy's associate-editor, 
Kate Nolan, downplayed Stohl's pictorial, explaining that Stohl 
was featured only because she ''looks exactly like everybody 
else. We're still saying, if you don't look like everybody else 
33 See id. at 173-79. 
34 Conceptions about disabled men were most challenged by the protagonists of 
the films Coming Home, Born on the Fourth of July, and The Waterdance, all of 
whom were paraplegics assertive about, and capable in, sexual roles. 
35 Judith Cummings, Disabled Model Defies Sexual Stereotypes, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 8, 1987, at C12. 
36 CHAVA WILLIG LEVY, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE INDEPENDENT LIVING 
MOVEMENT 32 (1988). The point was made with more panache (and clothes) by 
visually impaired entertainer Ray Charles at a July 1993 concert. Following his 
introduction of his back-up singers as the "beautiful Raylettes" a curious buzz 
went out of the audience, as if Charles's impaired vision begged the question of 
how he knew his assistants were "beautiful." Concert held at Radio City Music 
Hall, New York, N.Y. (July 31, 1993). After a dramatic pause, the singer growled 
into his microphone "Hell, I may be blind, but I ain't dead!" Id. Quadriplegic car-
toonist John Callahan debunks the disabled non-sexuality myth in a cartoon cap-
tioned "Handicapped people don't have sex." The drawing shows a man in a 
wheelchair being escorted to the hospital exit by four noticeably- pregnant nurses. 
JOHN CALLAHAN, DON'T WORRY, HE WON'T GET FAR ON FOOT 197 (1989). An en-
tire volume of Callahan cartoons on this subject recently was published. See JOHN 
CALLAHAN, THE NIGHT, THEY SAY, WAS MADE FOR LOVE PLUS MY SEXUAL SCRAP-
BOOK (1994). 
37 See WILLIG LEVY, supra note 36, at 32. 
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we're not putting you in the magazine."38 In other words, 
Stohl's photographs appeared only because she didn't ''look 
disabled." On the other hand, as disability rights advocate 
Chava Willig Levy quipped, "[l]ooking on the bright side, one 
could conclude that Ms. Stohl's feature shattered the myth that 
disability and [unattractiveness] must go hand-in-hand."39 
Besides Stohl's photographs, the disabled non-sexuality 
myth has been countered in the disabled community by the 
publication of many books and pamphlets on disabled sexuali-
ty40 and by the formation of educational and advocacy net-
works that address related concerns raised by people with 
disabilities.41 
In addition to making intimate interpersonal relationships 
difficult for disabled persons, another harmful result of the dis-
abled non-sexuality myth is that women with disabilities often 
are without benefit of adequate and physically accessible 
health care services. The prevailing presumption is that if 
women with disabilities will not or cannot engage in sexual ac-
tivity, then they do not need access to gynecological health 
care. Disabled writer and civil rights activist Cricket Potash 
often finds that during her annual OB/GYN examination "the 
people taking me to the examining room or taking information 
38 See Cummings, supra note 35, at C12. 
39 See WILUG LEVY, supra note 36, at 32. I agree with Levy. Regardless of 
what is thought of Playboy's moral virtues (or lack thereoO, the magazine's sub-
jects generally are considered attractive by mainstream society. 
'
0 See, e.g., HELPING THE SEXUALLY OPPRESSED (Harvey L. & Jean Gochros et 
al. eds., 1986); K. HESLINGA, NOT MADE OF STONE: THE SEXUAL PROBLEMS OF 
HANDICAPPED PEOPLE (1974); THOMAS 0. MOONEY ET AL., SEXUAL OPTIONS FOR 
PARAPLEGICS AND QUADRIPLEGICS (1975); PERSPECTIVES ON DISABILITY (Mark 
Nagler ed., 1990); REPRODUCTIVE ISSUES FOR PERSONS WITH PHYSICAL DISABILITIES 
(Florence P. Haseltine et al. eds, 1993); JUDITH ROGERS & MOLLEEN MATSUMARA, 
MOTHER TO BE: A GUIDE TO PREGNANCY AND BmTH FOR WOMEN WITH DISABILI-
TIES (1991); SEXUALITY AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY: "PERSONAL PERSPECTIVES (David 
H. Bullard & Susan E. Knight eds., 1981); TASK FORCE ON CONCERNS OF PHYSI-
CALLY DISABLED WOMEN, TOWARD INTIMACY: FAMILY PLANNING AND SEXUALITY 
CONCERNS OF PHYSICALLY DISABLED WOMEN (2d ed. 1978). Disability rights publi-
cations often devote entire issues to the subject. See, e.g., MOUTH: THE VOICE OF 
DISABILITY RIGHTS, May/June 1994 (issue devoted to "The Trouble With Sex"). In 
addition, several mail order catalogues offer sexual/erotic aides with special adap-
tations for individuals with disabilities. 
'
1 Examples include: Coalition on Sexuality and Disability; Sexuality and Dis-
ability Training Center; University of Michigan Sex and Disability Unit; Handicap 
Introductions; PEOPLENET; The Disability Rag ReSource; Independent Living and 
Health Care Today; and, Mainstream: Magazine of the Able-Disabled. 
1080 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60: 1069 
seem surprised to see me there. . . . The questions on their 
faces are loud, though they never say a word."42 Dr. Carol 
Gill, a member of the board of a women's health center, regu-
larly has difficulty obtaining OB/GYN care at the offices of her 
regular health care provider and is instead referred to a near-
by rehabilitation hospital. Gill sums up the irony of her situ-
ation: "I can't be just a woman who needs a pelvic exam; I 
must be a trail-blazer."43 
In the past few years, several projects sponsored and driv-
en by women with disabilities have arisen to address the 
dearth of health care in the United States for women with dis-
abilities.44 Among the current efforts under way, Women With 
Disabilities United is identifying physically accessible women's 
health service providers. Independent Living Research Utiliza-
tion is in the midst of a three-year National Institutes of 
Health ("NIH")-sponsored study into the psychosocial effect of 
physical disability on the capability of women with disabilities 
entering into intimate emotional and physical relationships. 
The NIH also sponsored a conference on "Reproductive Issues 
for Persons with Physical Disabilities."45 Other projects in-
clude The California Women's Law Center's conference on 
''Women's Rights: Disabled & Deaf Women in California." Sub-
jects covered included domestic and sexual violence, family law 
and family issues, and reproductive rights and reproductive 
health issues, with panelists from Access Living, Disabled 
Women's Network, the Domestic Violence Project and Planned 
Parenthood. 46 
Finally, and most closely related to Callo's experiences, as 
42 See Potash, supra note 17, at 30 . 
.a See Carol J. Gill, When Is a Woman Not a Woman, DISABILITY RAG RE-
SOURCE, May/June 1993, at 26. 
•• Women with disabilities also have begun to organize abroad. One example is 
DAWN-Dis-Abled Women's Network of Canada. 
45 See Barbara F. Waxman, The Year of the Disabled Woman, or Girls, It's 
Time to Flaunt Your Sexuality, DISABILITY RAG RESOURCE, May/June 1993, at 28; 
see also Gill, supra note 13, at 28-30. 
•• My thanks to Professor Carol Sanger for providing me with this information. 
In January 1993, a watermark was reached with the publication of the first edi-
tion of Disability, Pregnancy & Parenthood International. The periodical's stated 
goal is " 'to build a strong and lasting bridge across the gulf of ignorance that still 
exists about people with disabilities becoming or remaining parents.'" See New Pe-
riodical Focuses on Parenting with a Disability, DISABILITY RAG RESOURCE, 
May/June 1993, at 35. 
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a corollary to the disabled non-sexuality myth, severe 
misperceptions and prejudices abound regarding the capacity 
of individuals with disabilities to act in a parental or guardian-
ship capacity. The most striking-and perhaps infa-
mous-example of how the disabled non-sexuality myth has 
created ignorance and prejudice towards disabled people in 
their capacities as primary caretakers of children was a deci-
sion rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court in In re Mar-
riage of Carney.47 
In December 1968, William and Ellen Carney were mar-
ried in New York.48 After four years and two boys, they sepa-
rated. By written agreement, Ellen relinquished custody of the 
children to William who, because of employment reasons, 
moved with the boys to California. Soon thereafter, William be-
gan living with a woman named Lori Rivera who acted as 
stepmother to the Carney boys. The following year William and 
Lori had a daughter, and Lori proceeded to raise all three of 
the children as her own. 
In August 1976, while serving as a military reservist, 
William was injured in a jeep accident that left him a quadri-
plegic, with severely limited use of both his arms and legs. He 
spent the following year rehabilitating in a hospital, during 
which time his children visited him several times each week. 
In addition, William came home almost every weekend in a 
van that he had purchased and fitted with special hand con-
trols that allowed him to drive. 
In May 1977, William filed an action for the official disso-
lution of his marriage from Ellen. In response, Ellen moved for 
an order awarding her custody of their sons. At trial, expert 
and personal testimony was presented on the solid and loving 
relationship that William had with his sons.49 It also was un-
disputed that Ellen had not visited her sons or contributed in 
47 See Carney v. Carney, 598 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1979). The Carney case has been 
featured three times on the television journalism show "20/20." See Dave Matheis, 
A Look Back at the Carney Decision, DISABILITY RAG RESOURCE, May/June 1993, 
at 12, 14. Carney also is one of the very few cases involving individuals with 
disabilities to appear in domestic relations casebooks. See, e.g., JUDITH AREEN, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMll.Y LAW 531 (3d ed. 1992). 
48 The following recitation of facts is taken from the opinion of the California 
Supreme Court. See Carney, 598 P.2d at 37. 
49 For example, an expert psychiatrist testified that William had a "great" 
relationship with the boys. Id. at 41. 
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any way to their support during the five-year separation.50 
Nevertheless, the superior court ordered that the boys be im-
mediately transferred to their mother's custody in New York, 
and that William pay child support.51 Moreover, the court or-
dered William to pay Ellen's attorney's fees and court costs in 
addition to her travel and hotel expenses.52 
In transferring custody, the court based its ruling almost 
exclusively upon William's physical disability and its presumed 
adverse effect on his capacity to be a good father.53 With few 
exceptions, the questions voiced by the trial judge revolved 
around William's physical disability and its consequences, real 
or imaginary. For example, at the end of William's lengthy 
testimony about his present family life and his future plans, 
the trial judge asked him questions such as where William sat 
"when he got out of his wheelchair, whether he had completely 
lost the use of his arms, and what his medical prognosis 
was."54 The trial court reasoned that, because of William's 
physical disability, he could not "do anything for the boys him-
self except maybe talk to them and teach them, be a tutor, 
which is good, but it's not enough."55 After all, the judge rea-
soned, wouldn't it be better if the boys had a parent who could 
"take them places, play Little League baseball, go fishing?"56 
Because William could not, the court transferred custody of the 
boys from William to Ellen, stating that William's custody 
"wouldn't be a normal relationship between father and 
boys."57 
Although the superior court's decision was reversed by a 
sensitive and insightful opinion by the California Supreme 
Court, 58 it cannot, unfortunately, be viewed as an aberration. 
Instead, the lower court's opinion in Carney demonstrates a 
stereotypical viewpoint that Professor Laura Rothstein has 
noted, leads to "a judicial presumption of unfitness in many 
50 Id. at 37. 
51 598 P.2d at 37 n.2. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 39-40. 
54 Id. at 40. 
55 Id. at 41 (emphasis omitted). 
56 598 P.2d at 40. 
57 Id. at 41 (emphasis omitted). 
58 598 P.2d at 45; see infra text accompanying note 72. 
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cases involving child custody for handicapped parents."59 
Professor Rothstein observes that this 'judicial presumption of 
unfitness" often manifests itself in different guises for different 
types of disabilities:60 deaf parents are thought to be incapa-
ble of effectively stimulating language skills;61 blind parents 
cannot provide adequate attention or discipline;62 and parents 
with spinal cord injuries cannot adequately supervise their 
children. 63 
A common theme permeating those cases evincing a ste-
reotypical approach is that the courts perceive a parental rela-
tionship involving a disabled individual to be less than normal. 
For example, in In reAdoption of Richardson,64 a deaf-mute 
couple who had previously raised hearing children were denied 
59 RoTHSTEIN, supra note 17, at 185. But see Carney, 598 P.2d at 42 ("if a 
person has a physical handicap it is impermissible for the court simply to rely on 
that condition as prima facie evidence of the person's unfitness as a parent or of 
probable detriment to the child"); In re B.W., 626 P.2d 742, 743 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1981) ("the removal of a child from the legal custody of a parent who suffers from 
a handicap cannot be presumed to be in the best interests of the child based on 
the fact of the handicap alone"); Id. at 744 ("the court must evaluate a handi-
capped parent's actual and potential physical capabilities"); Michigan Dep't of So-
cial Servs. v. McDuel, 369 N.W.2d 912, 914 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) ("Parental rights 
may not be terminated on the basis of a parent's physical incapacity in the ab-
sence of culpable neglect."), superseded by, MICH. COMP. LAws § 712A.19b(3)(d) 
(1988), as stated in, In re Jacobs, 444 N.W.2d 789, 794 (Mich. 1989). 
In another context, Professor Martha Field has keenly observed that the rea-
son for judges' prejudice, even while acting totally in good faith, is that 'judges 
will often project onto the [child] their own fear of handicap." See Martha A. Field, 
Killing "the Handicapped"-Before and After Birth, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 79, 88 
(1993). A large part of the advocacy that I have performed on behalf of individuals 
with disabilities has raised the issue of prejudice among members of the legal 
profession. See generally Michael Ashley Stein, Attitudinal Barriers to Hiring Attor-
neys with Disabilities, 17 PHYSICAL & MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 214 (1993); Mi-
chael Ashley Stein, When Justice Is Blind: Appointing Vision-Impaired Individuals 
to the Bench, 1 MINORITY L.J. 5 (1992). 
60 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 17, at 185. 
61 See, e.g., Christensen v. Los Angeles County Bureau of Adoptions, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. 323, 327-28 (1967). 
62 See, e.g., In re B.W., 626 P.2d 742, 743 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (although the 
court found that there was adequate evidence to estimate that the physical and 
psychological manifestation of her disease contributed to an injurious environment 
for the children, the court also based its decision to place the children in the 
Department of Social Services' custody on evidence of physical abuse); In re 
Kurzawa, 290 N.W.2d 431 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). 
63 See, e.g., Carney, 598 P.2d at 39-41; see also supra text accompanying notes 
53-57. 
64 59 Cal. Rptr. 323 (Ct. App. 1967). 
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the right to adopt based on their disabilities. After admitting 
positive evidence on the integrity of the household, the judge 
posited: 
Is this a normally happy home? There is no question about it, it is a 
happy home, but is it a normal home? I don't think the Court could 
make a finding that it is a normal home when these poor unfortu-
nate people, they are handicapped, and what can they do in the way 
of bringing this child up to be the type of citizen we all want him to 
be.65 
The judge then wrote a letter to the county adoption bureau, 
admonishing them that "this adoption should be nipped in the 
bud before these unfortunate people get too attached to the 
child, as in my opinion, we are not doing right by the young-
ster in signing and approving an adoption to deaf-mutes."66 
Similar reasoning was used in In re Marriage of Levin. 67 
In Levin, the lower court awarded custody of a former couple's 
children to the father based upon the mother's use of a wheel-
chair following a stroke. The court reasoned that: 
Even though we know that children of the poor do as well as chil-
dren of the rich, maybe better, still a judge can't say to a child, 'You 
be poor.' I can't do that .... because of the limitations that the 
handicap imposes upon what I conceive to be the most, normal, 
possible life for a child. 68 
Perhaps what is most striking about the lower court deci-
sions in Carney, Richardson and Levin is their fundamental 
misunderstanding of the role of a parent as one that involves 
purely physically related skills. On the contrary, among the 
most essential elements of parenting are nurturing, loving, 
teaching, bonding, giving attention, guiding, communicating 
and transferring values. As disabled mother Melissa W alstead 
notes, "Changing diapers and bathing a child are not as impor-
tant as [loving], being there, laughing, or educating a child."69 
These elements are not dependent on physical ability. Indeed, 
one could argue that parents with disabilities are better suited 
65 Id. at 327 (emphasis added). 
66 Id. at 328. 
67 162 Cal. Rptr. 757 (Ct. App. 1980). 
68 Id. at 761 (emphasis added). 
69 More Love To Give Than Anyone: Excerpts from the Testimony of Melissa 
Walstead, DISABILITY RAG RESOURCE, May/June 1993, at 9 [hereinafter More Love 
To Give]. 
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than their able-bodied counterparts to help children ''broaden[] 
their perspective on issues of independence, relationships, 
commitment, problem-solving, life value, diversity, and flexibil-
ity."70 As one co-worker told a disabled mother, "[y]our kids 
are so terrific. You really did a good job .... And I think that's 
partially because you work at those other kinds of things that 
sometimes people leave out because they are so into the physi-
cal."71 
Perhaps the best rejoinder to the stereotype of physical 
parenting was made by the California Supreme Court during 
its reversal of the lower court in Carney, which is worth quot-
ing at length: 
[T]he stereotype is false because it fails to reach the heart of the 
parent-child relationship. Contemporary psychology confirms what 
wise families have perhaps always known-that the essence of 
parenting is not to be found in the harried rounds of daily 
carpooling endemic to modern suburban life, or even in the doggedly 
dutiful acts of "togetherness" committed every weekend by well-
meaning fathers and mothers across America. Rather, its essence 
lies in the ethical, emotional, and intellectual guidance the parent 
gives to the child throughout his formative years, and often beyond. 
The source of this guidance is the adult's own experience of life; its 
motive power is parental love and concern for the child's well-being; 
and its teachings deal with such fundamental matters as the child's 
feelings about himself, his relationships with others, his system of 
values, his standards of conduct, and his goals and priorities in 
life .... [H]owever limited his bodily strength may be, a handi-
capped parent is a whole person to the child who needs his affection, 
sympathy, and wisdom to deal with the problems of growing up.72 
10 See Prejudice, Plain and Simple: Excerpts from the Testimony of Carol Gill, 
DISABILITY RAG RESOURCE, May/June 1993, at 8, 8-9. 
71 Rousso, supra note 28, at 128. 
72 Carney, 598 P.2d at 44; see also Warnick v. Couey, 359 So. 2d 801, 803 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1978) ("Just as clear is the fact that while the husband's physical 
condition has greatly changed, his love and ability to care for the child has not 
changed."); In re Marriage of Levin, 162 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) 
(In determining what is in the best interests of a child "the court must consider 
the fact that the essence of parenting is ethical, emotional, and intellectual guid-
ance of the child-something which, by and large, is generally unrelated to the 
physical handicap of a parent."); In re Eugene W., 105 Cal. Rptr. 736, 740-41 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1972) ("It requires no detailed discussion to demonstrate that the support 
and, even more, the control of the child is primarily a mental function .... "). 
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II. A MOTHER'S TOUCH: THE TIFFANY CALLO STORY 
A Mother's Touch is a compassionate and absorbing ac-
count of disabled mother Tiffany Calla's struggle to regain 
custody of her two able-bodied children after they were re-
moved from her care by the Santa Clara County Department of 
Social Services ("DSS"). The central question addressed in A 
Mother's Touch is whether it was "fair and legal for a society to 
tell some of its members that they could not look forward to 
raising children because they were disabled."73 Mathews rais-
es this issue by chronicling Calla's life from the time of her 
own childhood through the court hearings that determined her 
sons' custody. 
A Mother's Touch recounts Calla's personal history in great 
detail. It tells the story of how Calla's parents met, conceived 
her, discovered that Calla had been born with cerebral palsy, 
and dissolved their marriage. The book then follows Calla as 
she was raised at various times by her grandmother-with 
whom she had a very close and loving relationship-and by her 
emotionally erratic father and a succession of stepmothers, one 
of whom viciously beat her.74 Calla was permanently removed 
from her father's custody and placed into foster care beca1;1se 
she did not explain the origin of her physical abuse when dis-
covered by DSS.75 One of the foster families with whom Calla 
lived had an especially positive impact upon her because "she 
found irresistible" their ''love and compassion and ease with all 
the intricacies of family life."76 
At age sixteen Calla tried living in a group home for dis-
abled young adults, but was raped by the director's fiance and 
another staff member. The director refused to believe that 
Calla had been coerced, "despite her obvious inability to fend 
off such an attack.'777 Thus, legal action did not occur "for a 
long time," during which Calla realized that she was pregnant 
and later miscarried.78 As a result of her group home experi-
ence, Calla. "resumed living with foster families, ... clung to 
73 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 177. 
74 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 48-51. 
75 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 51-57. 
76 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 58-59. 
77 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 60. 
78 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 60. 
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their order and warmth," and "thought often about how to bal-
ance her need for both security and independence."79 
Despite-or perhaps because of-her lack of a stable famil-
ial history, at age eighteen Callo ''began to think about what 
kind of a family she was going to make for herself."80 Shortly 
afterwards she fell in love with Tony, a disabled thirty-three-
year-old former gang member. Combining their disability pay-
ments, they were able to rent a small apartment and began 
living together. Callo soon discovered that she was pregnant. 
The thought was particularly exciting because of Calla's convic-
tion that she would be a good mother: 
She appreciated the small moments of a relationship with a child, of 
what she had had with her grandmother-the looks and the prom-
ises and the long, soft conversations. God had denied her many 
things, but He had given her an appreciation of stability and consis-
tency and the wise use of the 86,400 seconds in every day. She could 
take life slowly, with none of the guilt of the young executives she 
saw charging up Santa Clara Street with their dress-for-success 
suits and their thin briefcases. Her baby would get a lot of her 
time.sl 
Calla's pregnancy broke new ground for many of the peo-
ple around her. Neither the nurse whom DSS sent each month 
to check on Callo, nor any of the health care providers at her 
local hospital had any experience with pregnant women with 
disabilities. The able-bodied women in Calla's childbirth class 
often treated her ''like a piece of furniture."82 Calla's pregnan-
cy also engendered hostile responses. One woman who ap-
proached her on the street said, "I don't think it's right, a per-
son like you having a baby."83 
Mathews relates how DSS's response to the birth of Calla's 
first son David at the local hospital combined ignorance with 
prejudice. Because of DSS orders, David was bottle-fed against 
his own mother's express wishes and Callo wasn't allowed to 
see or hold her child for the first fourteen hours of his life. 
Although Callo had prepared for weeks for her post-partum 
experience, thinking through how she would care for her child, 
79 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 60. 
80 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 60. 
81 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 76. 
82 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 80. 
83 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 81. 
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she was told, almost immediately after birth by a county social 
worker, "If you don't cooperate with us, you may never see 
your son again."84 
While still in the hospital, Callo was questioned by Daryl 
E. Auten, a juvenile court officer, who later conducted an in-
trusive inspection of Callo's home. Although Callo pleaded with 
Auten-"I'll go to classes. . . . You tell me whatever is neces-
sary .... I want my kid at home,"-DSS never provided Callo 
with instruction or any other form of assistance in caring for 
her child and, therefore, she often was left to her own devic-
es.85 For example, because the nurse DSS sent to inspect 
Callo's child rearing abilities was unfamiliar with cribs for 
disabled parents, a friend of Callo's engineered a hinge that 
allowed her to easily reach David by pulling back one side of 
the crib. 
David was consigned to the custody of Callo's father and 
his new girlfriend, until Tony's sister Irene and her two chil-
dren moved in with the couple. As an additional condition to 
Callo regaining some custody of her son, she signed a state-
ment authorizing Irene· to keep David with her at all times, 
even when Irene left Callo's apartment. The living arrange-
ment was short-lived: Callo was forced to flee Tony's physical 
and emotional abuse-once again pregnant and now 
alone-and Irene turned David Callo over to DSS. 
DSS was less than sympathetic to Callo's plight. The as-
signed caseworker, Shirley Silvani, "doubted from the start" 
that Callo could care for David, and before even meeting Callo, 
Silvani noted in her log entries that Callo "'cannot provide any 
care . . . or even hold the baby.' "86 In addition, although 
Silvani had no experience with disabled parents, she rejected 
out of hand Callo's assertions that David was both aware of, 
and developmentally capable of responding to, the physical 
limitations caused by her disability. 
Moreover, when Silvani scheduled visitations for Callo 
with David it was in the DSS auditorium, a location referred to 
by DSS's own caseworkers as the "Zoo" because of the noise 
and confusion. Al_though Silvani explained in her notes that 
u MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 87. 
85 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 92. 
86 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 110. 
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the venue was most convenient for Callo because it was acces-
sible to a person using a motorized wheelchair, Silvani made 
no account of the noise and confusion. Instead, she related only 
that "'[t]he baby gets very frightened'" during visits and there-
fore "'does not have any meaningful interaction with 
[ Callo].' "87 
As the result of her conclusions, Silvani counseled Callo to 
give up David for adoption. After discovering Callo's new preg-
nancy a few weeks later, Silvani advised her to consider an 
abortion. When Calla refused both suggestions, DSS filed a 
petition to remove David from his mother's custody. The family 
court judge appointed an attorney, Clay Bedford, to assist 
Callo. Bedford promptly began a media campaign on Callo's 
behalf that continued through the birth and removal of her 
second son, Jesse. 
The media-television in particular-found "irresistible" 
the story of how a "county government had taken a baby away 
from a bright and beautiful young woman."88 As they crowded 
around her in the maternity ward, Callo succinctly summed up 
the origin of her woes: "'If I wasn't handicapped, they would 
not dare to take any of niy babies away.' "89 Bedford held a 
similar view of the issues that truly underlaid Callo's situa-
tion: 
It appalled him that DSS, like nearly every other child-protec-
tive agency in the country, paid more than five hundred dollars a 
month to keep a single child in a foster home but could not spend 
that same amount on an attendant to help a disabled mother raise 
her child in her own home. It offended him that [Callo] was in court 
only because her children were healthy and nondisabled. If they had 
been born disabled, they would have immediately qualified for atten-
dant care and could have been raised by [Callo]. Of course, if they 
had been disabled, probably no one but their mother would have 
wanted them anyway.90 
During Bedford's engineered media blitz, and prior to the 
court hearing that would determine custody of Callo's sons, 
Silvani asked psychologist Megan Kirshbaum to conduct an 
evaluation of Callo. Kirshbaum, founder of a nonprofit agency 
87 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 110-11. 
88 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 11. 
89 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 11. 
90 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 22. 
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called Through the Looking Glass, is one of the country's lead-
ing authorities on disabled parent~:? and an authority on devel-
oping adaptive parenting devices.91 She also is married to a 
disabled person and is the mother of a child with a congenital 
disability. 
Kirshbaum's evaluation took Calla's physical limitations in 
stride. For example, although Callo required more time than 
an able-bodied mother to accomplish parental tasks-changing 
diapers might take up to twenty minutes-Kirshbaum recog-
nized that Calla's speaking and cooing to David during diaper-
ing were "bridging techniques" that both calmed and reassured 
him.92 Instead of being a detrimental activity because of the 
time involved, the instinctive bridging techniques made for a 
pleasant experience. David became patient, adapting his be-
havior in response to his mother's disability. In addition, con-
trary to Silvani's observation that David feared his mother, 
Kirshbaum discovered that it was the strangeness and eleva-
tion of Calla's motorized wheelchair that had initially made the 
child uncomfortable. To counter the effect, Kirshbaum sat 
Callo on the floor opposite David who, now excited, played ball 
with his mother. To test her theory, Kirshbaum sat Silvani, 
with whom David was familiar, in Calla's wheelchair. When 
David was handed to Silvani, he cried. 
A Mother's Touch chronicles Calla's court battles to regain 
custody of her children and to reveal where and with whom 
David and Jesse Callo were assigned to live. The book also 
tells the story of how Callo finally found a gentle and loving 
partner. The real strengths of A Mother's Touch are Mathews's 
skills as a writer and his sympathetic viewpoint, which help 
make Calla's story even more engaging. Mathews also is tender 
in his portrayal of Callo as a mother, detailing with compas-
sion the interactions between mother and children during their 
frequently interrupted time together. 
If there is a notable shortfall to A Mother's Touch, it is 
that Mathews's use of interweaving flashbacks often confuse 
the chronology of events. A distaste for such artifice may, how-
ever, be no more than this lawyer's bias for first understanding 
and then telling stories in linear fashion with succeeding be-
91 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 146. 
92 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 201. 
, 
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ginnings, middles and ends. Nevertheless, Mathews's style is 
bright and vibrant and the story he tells is both relevant and 
compelling. 
III. THE NEED FOR A DEFINABLE LEGAL STANDARD 
A Mother's Touch is an important book that raises ques-
tions about mainstream society's understanding and treatment 
of parenting by people with disabilities. Tiffany Calla's story, 
together with the views reflected in the lower court decisions 
in Carney, Richardson, and Levin,93 forces several issues to be 
addressed. When called upon to determine a child's custody, 
courts traditionally base their decisions upon what they consid-
er to be "the best interests of the child."94 This determination 
of ''best interest" is arrived at through the balancing of many 
factors, including the potential custodial parent's ability to 
emotionally and financially support the child. When, however, 
one of the parents-or potential parents in the case of adop-
tion-is physically disabled, there is a question of how heavily 
a parent's disability should weigh in determining the best 
interests of the child. Should disability act as a total bar to 
parenthood or, instead, should the physical abilities of the 
putative custodian count as only one factor among several that 
may be considered in custody decisions? Most importantly, if 
physical ability is to be considered, what weight should it carry 
and how are the rights of disabled parents to be protected? 
A definable legal standard for determining the weight 
given to physical disability in custodial decisionmaking is nec-
essary. Currently, physical disability is a statutory ground for 
termination of parental rights in three states.95 California, 
93 See supra text accompanying notes 47-72. 
"' See generally AREEN, supra note 47, at 428; Jonathan A. Weiss, The Emerg-
ing Rights of Minors, 4 U. TOL. L. REV. 25, 26-36 (1972). Only a handful of cases 
have applied a "best interests" analysis in the context of disabled parents. See, 
e.g., Rains v. Alston, 576 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Ark. 1979) (en bane) ("The most impor-
tant matter to be considered by any court in matters of this nature is the best in-
terest of the infant child."); In re B.W., 626 P.2d 742, 744 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) 
("The paramount consideration in this type of proceeding is the best interests of 
the child."); Moye v. Moye, 627 P.2d 799, 801 (Idaho 1981) ("the physical condition 
of a parent is a valid consideration in a 'best interests' approach"). 
95 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-920(c)(2) (Michie 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-
609(3) (1983); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.04(B) (Anderson 1976). Similar pro-
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birthplace of the Carney, Richardson, and Levin decisions, re-
pealed a child custody statute containing language that would 
have protected disabled parents' rights.96 Professor Laura 
Rothstein has suggested that "in all cases . . . the standard 
should be to determine the best interests of the child, with the 
handicap of parents being only a factor for consideration, rath-
er than as establishing any kind of presumption of unfit-
ness."97 
Professor Rothstein's standard is similar to that of the 
Model Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,98 which has been 
adopted by a handful of states.99 A standard along the lines of 
the Rothstein/Madel Act standard should be adopted, but with 
one very strong qualification: When courts weigh "the handicap 
of parents" as a "factor for consideration," they must appreciate 
that certain parental tasks performed by the physically dis-
abled in ways different from those mainstream society consid-
ers "normal," may nevertheless constitute an equally valid 
performance of those tasks. Binding courts with a clear stan-
dard will require individual judges to (presumably) enunciate 
visions have been repealed in Maryland and Wyoming. 
98 See CAL. WELFARE & lNST. CODE § 300(a) (Deering 1985) ("No parent shall 
be found to be incapable of exercising proper and effective parental care or control 
solely because of a physical disability.") (repealed 1987). Likewise, Governor 
Deukmejian vetoed a California State Senate Bill that would have placed disabled 
parents on equftl ground with their able-bodied counterparts. MATIIEWS, supra note 
1, at 238-40. In 1989, the California State Legislature passed a vaguely worded 
bill, AB558, which may or may not provide the type of assistance Callo sought. Id. 
at 242. The current version of California's child custody statute, CAL. WELFARE & 
lNST. CODE § 300G) (Deering 1993), contains the following language: 
[A] physical disability, such as blindness or deafness, is no bar to the raising 
of happy and well-adjusted children and that a court's determination pursuant 
to this section shall center upon whether a parent's disability prevents him or 
her from exercising care and control. 
97 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 17, at 186. 
98 Section 402 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides that the 
following factors be balanced in determining custody decisions: "(1) the wishes of 
the child's parent or parents as to his custody; (2) the wishes of the child as to 
his custodian; (3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent 
or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the 
child's best interest; (4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; 
and (5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved." UNIF. MAR-
RIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1992). 
99 As of this writing, those states include Arizona, Colorado, illinois, Kentucky, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana and Washington. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 
ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1992). 
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the weight they give to the various factors so that, at the very 
least, a record may be established to contest their rulings.100 
Although not yet challenged in court, such a qualification 
may well be required from a legal perspective under equal 
protection, procedural due process, and ADA analyses. For 
instance, under an equal protection analysis, a court strictly 
scrutinizes state action when the action impacts upon a sus-
pect class of people, or when the state action affects a funda-
mental right. Although people with disabilities currently are 
not considered a suspect class,101 the rights of procreation 
and parenting repeatedly have been recognized as fundamen-
tal. 102 Therefore, procreative and parental rights of disabled 
people probably would be upheld under strict scrutiny. Addi-
tionally, procedural due process requires that a fair adjudica-
tive procedure be afforded to individuals prior to depriving 
them of life, liberty or property. Judging people with disabili-
ties by able-bodied standards is hardly equitable, and thus an 
invalid process. 103 Finally, Title II of the ADA prohibits pub-
lic entities from excluding disabled people from participation in 
their various benefits and services.104 While not yet inter-
preted by any reported decisions in this specific context, Title 
II conceivably will prevent social service agencies from shun-
ning disabled parents because of their special needs. 
100 I have used the term "presumably" in deference to the continuing debate 
among legal scholars over whether judges are knowingly capable of or willing to 
state their true reasons for reaching any given decision. Compare Scott Altman, 
Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990) with David L. Shapiro, In Defense of 
Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987). My view on this matter is opti-
mistically fatalistic: I believe in the general integrity of our judges; nevertheless, · 
judges who wish to conceal their true motives_ always will be able to do so. 
101 See Marcia P. Burgdorf & Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal 
Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under 
the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855 (1975) (positing that the 
disabled should be regarded as a suspect class). I find most of the Burgdorfs' 
analysis to be persuasive. 
102 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
103 Judge Devine observed in another context, "[a]ssessing the capability of vari-
ous individuals to perform . . . without an individualized determination of their 
strengths and weaknesses would appear to be impossible." Garrity v. Gallen, 522 
F. Supp. 171, 206 (D.N.H. 1981). 
104 Title II provides, in pertinent part, that "no qualified individual with a dis-
ability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be 
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 
subjected to discrimination by such an entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. II 1990). 
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Qualifying the standard by which disabled parents' disabil-
ities are evaluated by accepting different physical methodology, 
certainly is crucial from a social perspective because 
"[t]ypically, the differences that cultures outside of the domi-
nant culture present have been thought of as deficiencies."105 
AB Professor Martha Minow has persuasively and eloquently 
demonstrated, '"[d]ifference' is only meaningful as a compari-
son."106 To be different requires first that there be an estab-
lished and known norm from which one can differ, for it is 
impossible to be out of the mainstream unless a mainstream 
exists. Professor Minow writes that the 
treatment of difference tends to take for granted an assumed point 
of comparison: women are compared to the unstated norm of men, 
"minority" races to whites, handicapped persons to the able-bod-
ied .... Difference may seem salient not because of a trait intrinsic 
to the person but instead because the dominant institutional ar-
rangements were designed without the trait in mind. Consider the 
difference between buildings built without considering the needs of 
people in wheelchairs and buildings that are accessible to people in 
wheelchairs.107 
In the context of parenting, the disabled non-sexuality 
myth108 leads society to envision its children raised by able-
bodied people. Parents with physical disabilities exist outside 
the parameters of this norm, if at all. Modifying Professor 
Minow's analogy, consider the difference between social service 
agency evaluations that judge disabled people by able-bodied 
standards-such as applying a Rorschach test to a person with 
cerebral palsy who may have perceptual difficulties109-and 
social service agency evaluations like those performed by 
105 Susan O'Connor, Culture, Disability and Family Policy, 2 CTR. ON HUM. 
POL 'Y BULL. 4, 4-5 (1992). 
106 Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engen-
dered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 13 (1987) [hereinafter Minow, Justice Engendered). 
Many of my thoughts in this section are drawn from Martha Minow's fine writings 
on legal sensitivity to difference, and are indebted to her insight. See MARTHA 
MINOW, THE MEANING OF DIFFERENCE (1991); Martha Minow, All in the Family & 
In All Families: Membership, Loving, and Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 275 (1992) 
[hereinafter Minow, All in the Family]; Martha Minow, Redefining Families-Who's 
In and Who's Out, 62 U. CoLO. L. REV. 269 (1991) [hereinafter Minow, Redefining 
Families]. . 
107 Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 106, at 13-14. 
108 See supra text accompanying notes 17-43. 
109 See MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 180-81. 
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Megan Kirshbaum, which adapt "normal" techniques to the 
needs of the disabled-for example, seating a wheelchair-using 
parent on the floor so that she can communicate on an equal 
plane with her child.11° Consider also the difference between 
treating as normal an increasingly common parenting practice 
ih which children of able-bodied parents are raised almost 
exclusively by nannies, while treating as inadequate an emo-
tionally close and loving parenting relationship in which cer-
tain physical tasks, such as food preparation, are performed by 
an individual assisting disabled parents. 
Tiffany Calla's physical differences meant spending more 
time in performing parental tasks such as changing her 
children's diapers. She facilitated the task by using velcro 
fastenings instead of safety pins.m For other disabled par-
ents physical difference takes on other manifestations. Dorothy 
Wainer, who walks with a pronounced limp as the result of 
childhood polio, utilizes "every single device in terms of trans-
portation" to maintain her balance, including strollers, snugli 
carriers, 112 sassy seats, 113 backpacks and a cane. 114 Carol 
Ann Roberson, a post-polio quadriplegic who could hold neither 
her children nor a book, learned to read upside down so that 
she could read to her children while they sat in front of her 
holding their books facing them.115 Cathy Cates, who is bal-
anced-impaired, learned to improvise her ambulation tech-
niques in order to carry her baby. Indoors, Cates used a stroll-
er and leaned on walls. Outside, Cates used child carriers with 
front and back straps and trained herself to use one crutch 
instead of two so that she would have a free hand to carry both 
purse and diaper bag.116 
Even with the accomplishment of parental tasks through 
different techniques, mothers with disabilities fear that main-
110 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 137-49. 
111 MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 194, 215. 
112 A "snugli carrier" is a pouch that straps around a person's neck and back so 
that a young child can sit against his or her parent's chest while leaving the 
parent's arms free. 
113 A "sassy seat" latches onto a table, making it easier to feed a baby if a 
parent has weak upper extremities. 
114 Rousso, supra note 28, at 78-79. 
115 Rousso, supra note 28, at 127-28. 
116 Cathy Cates, One Mother's Experience, DISABILITY RAG RESOURCE, May/June 
1993, at 25. 
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stream society will remove their children because of prevailing 
misconceptions. The result is the diminishment of parental joy 
for otherwise able and loving parents. Roberson admits that 
"[w]hen my kids were younger, I can remember always being 
afraid [that] .... someone would possibly take my kids away 
from me because the expectation might be that I couldn't do it 
alone."117 Similarly, Cates concedes that "[o]ne of my biggest 
fears has been that my children would be taken away because 
some bureaucrats decided that my physical limitations made 
me an inadequate parent."118 
Mainstream society is slowly developing a broader recogni-
tion of family and parenthood than the model presented in the 
television show "Father Knows Best," which featured a house-
hold headed by a same-race, heterosexual couple raising their 
own biological children. 119 It is increasingly common for inter-
raciaP20 or gay couples121 or single parents122 to raise 
117 See Rousso, supra note 28, at 127. 
118 Cates, supra note 116, at 25; see also More Love To Give, supra note 69, at 
9 ("If something happened to my husband, would my child be taken away from 
me?"). 
119 See generally Elizabeth Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Sta-
tus: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has 
Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984); Minow, Redefining Families, supra note 106; 
Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: Limits of the Functional Approach to the 
Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (1991). 
120 
"In 1992, the U.S. Census reported more than a million interracial marriages 
in this country." Lise Funderburg, Looking For a Legacy Beyond Black and White, 
N.Y. NEWSDAY, Dec. 16, 1993, at 125; see also LISE FuNDERBURG, BLACK, WHITE, 
OTHER: BIRACIAL AMERICANS TALK ABOUT RACE AND RACIAL IDENTITY (1994); Da-
vid Jacobson, Does "Pelican Brief"· Practice Abstinence for Racial Reasons?, 
GANNE'IT NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS 
File, at *4 ("The number of black-white marriages is growing 'exponentialli .... 
There were only 65,000 interracial married couples in 1970 . . . . But in 1992, 
there were almost a quarter million such marriages.") (quoting Carlos Fernandez, 
president of the Association of MultiEthnic Americans). My thanks to Scott Geddes 
of Mead Data Central for providing me with these citations. 
121 See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Rede-
fining Parenthood To Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other 
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990); Mary P. Treuthart, Adopting a 
More Realistic Definition of "Family," 26 GoNZ. L. REV. 91 (1991). But see Alison 
D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991) (deny-
ing visitation rights to lesbian ex-lover of natural mother) see also Kimberly P. 
Carr, Comment, Alison D. v. Virginia M.: Neglecting the Best Interests of the Child 
in a Nontraditional Family, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (1992) (arguing that 
courts should determine the best interests of a child by "analyzing the nature of 
the relationship between the petitioner and the child"). 
122 See NATIONAL COMM'N ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN 
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traditionally or openly adopted children123 of their own or dif-
ferent races124 in ''blended," multi-generational, or extended 
family arrangements.125 Nor should it be uncommon for peo-
ple with disabilities to raise children. The social construct of 
being disabled126 is no more removed from the "Father Knows 
Best" model than are other social constructs. Many of the ra-
tionales that have been used to argue for parental rights127 of 
these groups apply equally to the disabled. 
One example of a parallel rationale is the Supreme Court's 
treatment of interracial marriage and step-parentage in 
Palmore v. Sidoti. 128 Rejecting a divorced white father's claim 
to custody based solely on his white ex-wife cohabiting with 
and later marrying an African American, the Court reasoned 
that: 
It would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic preju-
dices do not exist .... There is a risk that a child living with a step-
parent of a different race may be subject to a variety of pressures 
and stresses not present if the child were living with parents of the 
same racial or ethnic origin. 
The question, however, is whether the reality of private biases 
and the possible injury they might inflict are permissible consider-
ations for removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural 
mother. We have little difficulty concluding that they are not. The 
Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it toler-
ate them.129 
Another example is the recognition of homosexual parental 
AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 18 (1991) (almost one-quarter of all Ameri-
can children live in single-parent households). 
123 See Minow, All in the Family, supra note 106, at 287. 
124 See Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of 
Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991). 
125 
"[T)he 'family' is not one entity but a multitude of unique interpersonal 
relationships bound by complicated mixtures of biology, culture, love, and depen-
dence, and threatened by complicated internal and external pressures." Martha 
Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH. 
J.L. REF. 933, 989 (1985); see also Minow, All In the Family, supra note 106, at 
284-86. 
126 See generally CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITZ, DISABIT.ITY AS A -SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 
(1988); see also NORA E. GROCE, EVERYONE HERE SPOKE SIGN LANGUAGE: HEREDI· 
TARY DEAFNESS ON MARTHA'S VINEYARD (1985) (account of nineteenth-century com-
munity comprised mostly of hearing-inlpaired people). 
127 See generally Elizabeth Bartlett, supra note 119; Marsha Garrison, Why 
Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423 (1983). 
128 466 u.s. 429 (1984). 
129 Id. at 433. 
1098 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60: 1069 
rights by a New York State court in In re Adoption of 
Evan.130 The Evan court explained that: 
this is not a matter which arises in a vacuum. Social fragmentation 
and the myriad configurations of modern families have presented us 
with new problems and complexities that cannot be solved by ideal-
izing the past. Today a child who .... receives the love and nurture 
of even a single parent can be counted among the blessed.131 
By recognizing the equality of physical difference in performing 
parenting tasks, either of the above quotations can be re-read 
with the disabled jn mind. 
The recognition of difference for disabled parents currently 
is under attack in a case involving a Michigan couple.132 Bill 
Earl and Leigh Campbell Earl, a married couple with cerebral 
palsy, are engaged in a fight with the Ingham County Depart-
ment of Social Services over the care of their non-disabled 
child Natalie. Current state regulations provide that personal 
care assistants hired to care for disabled people may not touch 
their clients' children during paid working hours. Without 
assistance from. their attendant, the Earls cannot attend to all 
of Natalie's physical needs and may lose custody of their 
daughter. 
The Earls' plight garnered enough attention to warrant a 
joint hearing of the Michigan legislature, at which many dis-
ability rights advocates testified. 133 One of those witnesses 
130 153 Misc.2d 844, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1992). 
131 Id. at 852, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1002. Professor Sylvia Law wrote the report 
upon which the court based its findings. See id. at 845, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 998. 
132 The discussion that follows is drawn from the May/June 1993 issue of the 
Disability Rag ReSource, which featured the topic "Parenting With a Disability." 
133 Among those testifying were Barbara Faye Waxman, Carol Gill, Cecily Cagle 
and Alan Bergman. Bergman noted that while "home maintenance and minor re-
pairs, yard work" were allowable activities for personal health care attendants, 
child care was not. See Yard Work, Yes. Child Care, No: Excerpts from the Testi-
mony of Alan Bergman, DISABILITY RAG RESOURCE, May/June 1993, at 7-8. 
Bergman's point has wider and more ironic implications. In an effort to keep chil-
dren with their (non-disabled) parents, social service agencies often are required by 
state statute to provide drug and alcohol rehabilitation, job training and housing 
placements, see, e.g., In re Sheila G., 61 N.Y.2d 368, 385, 462 N.E.2d 1139, 1147, 
474 N.Y.S.2d 421, 430-32 (1984); In re Gyvon Lamar P., 190 A.D.2d 592, 593 
N.Y.S.2d 791 (App. Div., 1st Dep't 1993); In re Custody of Courtney L., 188 
A.D.2d 265,590 N.Y.S.2d 456 (App. Div., 1st Dep't 1992) (Michael A. Stein and 
Barbara H. Dildine on the briefs for the respective children), yet nothing specifical-
ly requires these agencies to undertake sinlilar efforts at maintaining disabled 
parent/non-disabled children family arrangements. For a scathing analysis of one 
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was Tiffany Callo. Addressing the joint houses, Callo asked: 
How many of you legislators are parents? How would you like 
it if someone legally kidnapped your little boy or little girl? Would 
you miss them? It's the same with us. We have the same needs to 
have children, but not the same rights to keep them. . . . [W]hy 
should parents with disabilities still be discriminated against in our 
basic rights to be parents?134 
Just as she did in A Mother's Touch, Callo continues to raise 
some serious, unanswered questions. 
state's termination procedures, see Jonathan Weiss & Oscar Chase, The Case for 
Repeal of Section 383 of the New York Social Services Law, 4 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REv. 325 (1972). 
134 
"Unfit" Because of My Disability: Excerpts from the Testimony of Tiffany 
Calla Brazil, DISABILITY RAG RESOURCE, May/June 1993, at 9. 
